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Abstract — Industrial control and automation systems are 
evolving towards infrastructures more connected. Its 
component’s interconnection makes the m mo re  dependent    
on the networks and communication protocols used. On the 
one hand, high performance, low costs and  real-time 
capabilities  are  generally required to  cope  with  more  and  
more  demanding application requirements; while  on  the  
other  hand, security solutions are often needed  in an 
increasing  number of communication attack scenarios. As 
part of new lift control generation, we will analyze a transition 
case from an electrical/electro technical component to network 
of communicating electronic components as part of the safety 
displacement system. This paper will  describe the analysis of 
dependability requirements for the next electronic lift 
control. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Nowadays, there are many industrial Ethernet protocols, 
which could act as ﬁeldbus functionality. The introduction 
of Ethernet techniques in industrial communication allow to 
reduce the infrastructure costs.  In  this  way  the  replacing 
cables by ﬁeld bus has evolved from simple protocols such 
as  Modbus  (ASCII  format)  to  Internet  Protocol  standard. 
The lift domain design has undergone same evolutions as 
the automotive domain; manufacturing cost, wiring reduction, 
energy optimization and meet a new norms constraints. 
Nowadays, the lift safety chain based on interconnected 
electromechanical elements with interconnecting wireline 
cables.  Therefore  it  requires  a  large  number  of  cables  
that have a direct impact on the product cost and its 
installation complexity  and  thus  its  installation  costs.  So, 
in order to reduce these costs (installation cost, maintenance, 
certiﬁcation, etc.) we will perform safety functions.  This is 
done by means of a programmable electronic system to 
achieve some standardization requirements and not with 
electromechanical devices. We make an original approach in 
the lift eco-system, which uses a deterministic operating 
system [1] from Krono- safe Company (spin off CEA). To 
ensure the safety of people transportation, system availability 
should be considered behind the relevant safety. The 
deterministic lift control system is one of the ADN4SE 
project demonstrators (BGLE project). The global aim is to 
design and develop new lift safety functions supported on 
deterministic kernel and associated tools in accordance with 
the required lift-safety standard in order to achieve product 
certiﬁcation. 
The main contribution in this paper is an analysis case of 
the adopted standard IEC 61508 requirements speciﬁcation 
targeting  the  development  of  a  new  safety  chain  for  lift 
control system that allow to achieve SIL3. In addition, we 
propose a new lift safety architecture using a deterministic 
kernel to improve the safe real-time communication within 
the safety chain, in accordance with the safety standard. The 
challenge that is especially addressed is having a product 
certiﬁable PESSRAL with the integration of a deterministic 
core in electromechanical safety chain, i.e. transition from an 
electrical/electro technical component to network of 
communicating electronic components while respecting the 
business application speciﬁcations. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In 
section II we present the existing architecture of the actual lift 
system, and we identify some problems in this architecture. In 
section III we analyze the safety requirements speciﬁcation in 
the lift control system generally. Section IV describes a study 
case of existing ﬁeldbus in lift eco-system, and we identify 
the bus limits in relation to the described standard safety. In 
section V and VI, we present our proposal. We describe the 
industrial communication over Ethernet with a classiﬁcation 
for real-time communication. We propose how an Ethernet- 
based industrial communication can reach SIL3 and can be 
supported by deterministic kernel. Finally in Section VII we 
represent our conclusions. 
 
II.  THE SAFETY CHALLENGE IN THE LIFT APPLICATION 
CONTROL 
Fig. 1 shows a lift demonstrator with a safety chain as 
currently running on the majority of lifts. Range of serial 
contacts whose purpose is to allow the displacement lift car 
control compose this safety chain. The displacement lift car 
is only possible if all the contacts are closed. However, the 
behavior of these elements is not identiﬁable, which 
complicate the safety chain control. It will be more difﬁcult 
to identify the failed contact in the actual chain. We cannot 
neglect the mechanical maintenance costs of the safety chain. 
So, making the safety chain smarter is a business need. But 
without forgetting the security level required in this type of 
application because that will direct inﬂuence on human life. 
The applicable standards for lift safety system design are 
deﬁned in EN 81-1 (Speciﬁcation of the safety requirements 
for the design and installation of electric lifts), PESSRAL 
(Programmable Electronic components and Systems in Safety 
Related Applications for Lifts) 
  
 
Fig. 1.  Actual safety chain in the lift architecture. 
 
 
 
and ISO022201: 2008 (Standard relating to programmable 
electronic systems integrated in the safety chain of a lift). 
The main objective of the project is to design new lift 
demonstrator that is, applying the IEC 61508 standard, 
using SIL 3 certiﬁed safety bus, simplifying the certiﬁcation 
phase, reducing testing effort and hosting (reassemble) 
critical and non-critical functions on the same micro-
controller. The  demonstrator  must  be  capable  to  integrate  
third-party non-critical functions  without  undermining the  
certiﬁcation of critical functions. To minimize failures and 
maintain the dependability to a certain level, in electrical, 
electronic and programmable electronic systems, the IEC 
61508 [2][3] speciﬁes 4 safety integrity levels in terms of 
dependability (SIL1, SIL2, SIL3, and SIL4) [4]. These cover 
features security systems and requires from its conception to 
meet and satisfy certain criteria and safety conditions [5]. 
Automatic electronic architectures need to perform more and 
more functions that are mapped onto different electronic 
components because of their different safety level or 
different application domains. For our application 
demonstrator domain (Lift), we would reach IEC 61508 SIL3 
level. To achieve this safety integrity level, our system must 
satisfy speciﬁc requirements for the lift application control. 
The PESSRAL, derived standard from IEC 61508 and speciﬁc 
lift application domain, details these requirements and identify 
business requirements and hardware requirements standard, 
and  the  digital  management system of  the  lift  must  be  
consistent with  this  requirements. The PESSRAL standard is 
based on the guidelines provided by IEC 61508 and EN81 
(CEN). It speciﬁes dedicated hardware and software 
requirements to ensure SIL 3 integrity level [4]. But it did not 
assign roles to implement responsible. 
 The functions relating to the lift safety (51 functions, which 
allow the system to meet the SIL3 requirements) must not be 
less than SIL1 and not more than SIL3 [6]. These functions 
are implemented in order to bring the system into safe state or 
maintain the system on its safe state according to the speciﬁc 
random events. The features and functions associated with 
the integrity level SIL3 must meet performed in the 
communication layer [5]. The designers must list the customer 
requirements and describe the secure states in the lift system. 
These states depend primarily on the responses of safety 
functions applied. There is some requirement identiﬁcation: 
•  Hardware requirements: 09 PESSRAL requirements. 
•  Software requirements: 16 PESSRAL requirements. 
III.  ANALYSIS OF REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATION 
In this project we aim to design and develop lift depend- 
ability functions for electronic systems using deterministic 
kernel ”Kron-OS” and its tools that are safety by 
construction [7]. These functions must be PESSRAL certiﬁed. 
Each client requirement must have a structure that brings 
together and combined among the normative, functional and 
temporal requirements as shown in Fig. 2. In the next 
sentences will describe each requirement and we assign an 
identiﬁer relative to that of the root requirement, for example: 
•  Root requirement: 
–  Description: Protection against the excessive speed 
of the car uphill. 
–  Security requirement: YES. 
–  Risk covered: fall of the cabin. 
•  Functional requirement: 
–  Description: A traction lift must be provided with a 
device for protection against excessive speed of the 
car uphill. The device including a supervisory and 
speed reduction unities, must detect an uncontrolled 
movement of the car uphill at a speed of at least 115 
of the nominal speed. The device must act on the 
cabin, counterweight, the cable system (suspension 
or compensation) or the traction sheave. 
•  Temporal requirement: 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Requirement composition and deﬁnition -ADN4SE 
document project.
–  Description: system reaction time ≤ 100ms. 
•  Certiﬁcation requirement: 
–  Description: Lift-safety function (id 12) (among 51 
functions). 
•  Dependability requirement: 
–  Description: this function must be SIL2. 
Achieving PESSRAL links four partners for this demon- 
strator in the ADN4SE project: 
•  LCIS: specialized dependability in industrial 
communication. 
•  SPRINTE: for the provision of the lift speciﬁcations. 
•  Krono-safe: for providing the real-time software solution. 
•  Schneider Electric: expert in the development of critical 
systems. 
To ensure the safety integrity level SIL3 over the whole lift 
safety chain, which must be ensured with a single 
communication channel, we will use an important means of 
communication certiﬁed SIL 3 [8]. With a view to 
simpliﬁcation, the bus must transmit critical and non-critical 
messages. 
 
IV.  EXISTING FIELDBUS IN LIFT ECO-SYSTEM 
According to its original purpose, CAN, using bus topology,  
is  strongly  established  in  the  automotive  industry  to 
reduce cable harnesses in vehicles. It is not suitable for 
transmission of  data  over  long  distances  with  a  high  rate 
(for  an  indicative maximum length  of  40  m  it’s  1  Mbps) 
[9].  This  one  is  particularly  suitable  for  located  systems 
with distributed intelligence and high reliability constraints 
[10]. His main objective was reliability with a low cost. 
Mercedes-Benz was the ﬁrst automaker to equip his vehicles 
with CAN protocol. Since many manufacturers use it such 
Intel, Philips, Siemens, Motorola, NEC and Texas Instruments, 
were the ﬁrst to implement the protocols in micro-controllers. 
The  CAN  protocol is  a  multi-master contention type  (any 
master  station  can  initiate  a  frame  as  soon  as  the  bus  is 
free allowing the production and consumption of information 
transmitted by diffusion thereof. This is a CSMA protocol with 
access collision inhibition (Carrier Sense Multiple Access with 
Collision Resolution CSMA/CR) for priority frame by bitwise 
arbitration. Each node performs this bitwise arbitration. Any 
anomaly detected during the arbitration allow transmitter node 
to stop immediately its transmission. It is not possible to 
calculate a maximum reaction time, because CAN is not as 
deterministic except possibly for the data to have always the 
highest priority [10]. 
In the automation world, an international users group and 
manufacturers deﬁned a subset of CAN protocol in the Can in 
Automation (CiA 04). The CiA group speciﬁed the application 
layer of the protocol stack over CAN bus: physical, data link 
and application. CANOpen based proﬁles are only software 
solution. The CanOpen application layer protocol supports 
synchronous and asynchronous channels shared. The 
synchronous transmission cycle is deﬁned by the cyclic 
transmission of a synchronization frame (SYNC frame 
priority). The CANOpen proﬁle applicative speciﬁcations 
describe the virtual devices (12 VD) for lift control system. 
The virtual controllers (Call Controller, Controller car door, 
car drive controller) perform control functions dedicated to the 
lift application. In this application, all the control functions 
can be implemented in a single CANOpen device. Although 
in other applications, control functions must be implemented 
in different and various CANOpen devices. Virtual devices 
are implemented each in a CANOpen device as they can be 
combined in one or more devices CANOpen-Lift (Cia 417) 
and allows it to be a simple and sophisticated application. The 
virtual devices set are: Call- Controller, Car-door-Controller, 
Car-drive-Controller, Input- panel-Unit, Output- panel-Unit, 
Car-door-Unit, Light-barrier-Unit, Car-drive-unit, Car-
position-Unit, Load-measuring-Unit, Remote-data- 
transmission-Unit, and Power-measuring-unit. The CAN 
protocol introduces object-oriented communication. In- deed, 
the CANOpen protocol uses the objects dictionary. It deﬁnes 
all the objects that can be exchanged in the network. Each 
object is addressed using a 16-bit index and a sub- index of 8 
bits. Each node must have an object dictionary through which 
data transmission will be possible as shown in Fig. 3. While 
Can is largely adopted in industrial processes automation, it 
has disadvantages that limit its use as follows [11]: 
•  Transmission rate: It can reach as maximum throughput 
10 Mbps, which is relatively, low (with FTT-Can version). 
• Limited frame format: the CAN bus is dedicated for 
industrial communication systems that limit transmitted 
information types. 
 
V.  DETERMINISITIC FIELDBUS 
The industrial communication protocols, as well as ﬁeldbus 
must meet the constraints of industrial communication [9][12] 
•  Robust to the industrial environment (physical layer). 
•  Deterministic (ensuring the data refresh in cycle time) 
(Data Link Layer). 
•  Interoperable (exchanging information among all types of 
industrial equipment) (Application Layer). 
Interoperability is the term most sensitive in terms of cost. 
New industry communication concepts progress after some 
problems in ﬁeldbus network classic (determinism, reaction 
time, throughput, portability...). IEC TC65 has launched a 
new standardization project for industrial communication. Set 
the real-time Ethernet in the industry seems a logical 
consequence of the Ethernet introduction in industrial 
automation. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Exchange principle of objects in CANOpen.
Researchers continue to propose solutions to the Ethernet 
speciﬁcations to meet the criteria of real-time. There are those 
who offer solutions for quality of service, devices 
synchronization or packet processing/modiﬁcation to resolve 
Real-Time constraint [13]. 
After that, Ethernet has positioned itself as standard solution 
for industrial communication replacing classical ﬁeldbus as 
CAN. Ethernet Real Time (RTE) resolves some existing 
problems in industrial control system [14][15] as; rate 
transmission (high rate about 1Gbps), over Ethernet, different 
kinds of data can be transmitted (Audio, Video...) and using 
Ethernet allows integrating different applications. 
Considering the reaction time for the Ethernet-based real-
time solutions, we can classify their protocols into 3 classes 
as shown in Fig. 4. 
•  Class 1: Top of transport layer (over TCP/UDP); low 
speed class, reaction time     100ms, moderate efﬁcacy 
(e.g. Ethernet/IP). 
•  Class  2:  Top  of  Ethernet layer;  required by  automate 
(PLC, control PC), reaction time < 10ms, hardware 
implementing to reduce the TCP/IP stack (e.g. 
PowerLink, Proﬁnet RT). 
•  Class 3: Modiﬁed Ethernet (most challenging); required 
by Motion Control, reaction time <1ms, high 
synchronization precision (e.g. EtherCAT, Proﬁnet IRT). 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Real-time Ethernet classiﬁcation. 
 
These solutions will be implemented over deterministic 
kernel safe by construction, which requires speciﬁc criteria to 
accelerate and ensure communication in the industrial system. 
Besides the reaction time, the communication model has to 
guarantee SIL3 safety level in communication phase to ensure 
the portability capacity of the deterministic operating system 
in embedded environments constrained. In this work, we are 
relying on actual architecture of safety chain in lift control 
system, improving it components behavior by introduction 
of controllers node network communicated instead of electric 
contact. Fig. 5 depicts the considered system with our 
modiﬁcations in safety chain. However, in our approach we 
are introducing network-based safety chain with 
communication network  to  transfer  sensor  measurements 
and  control  data using  Ethernet based  real  time  protocol. 
 We are replacing electric contacts with tow node kinds: 
Controlled node (CN) and manager node (MN). These new 
safety chain components are connected through an Ethernet 
network and the data frames are encapsulated in Ethernet 
PowerLink (EPL). 
 
VI.  OPEN SAFETY 
The industrial communication in deterministic networks is 
far from being secure, it guarantees perfect synchronization 
among devices, and meets the temporal requirements imposed 
by the deterministic kernel, or the standard but not wholes 
safety requirements. To strengthen the security in this 
communication networks, we need to add a security 
measures at the top of application layer. OpenSAFETY is an 
application layer communication protocol. It ensures the 
security of the transmission frames. It allows creating 
communication systems requiring SIL 3 (Safety Integrity 
Level) according to IEC61508. OpenSAFETY is a set of 
components offering services and security mechanisms for 
secure data exchange via networks unsecured [16]. For 
example: 
•  Time stamp: This timestamp mechanism allows 
associating with each frame the time and date of 
transmission in order to avoid duplication of frames. 
•  Time monitoring: This time monitoring can predict 
moments of frame arrival and thus can detect losses and 
delays. 
•  Identiﬁcation: Each frame is identiﬁed by a unique 
identiﬁer to prevent and detect any kind of integration. 
•  Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC): To ensure the integrity 
of messages sent and to avoid the alteration and 
modiﬁcation of data, OpenSAFETY uses the CRC. 
•  Frame format: Using different frame format allows the 
distinction between the standard frame and the Open 
SAFETY frames. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.  Modiﬁed safety chain in lift control system.
OpenSAFETY operates at the application layer 
independently from real time Ethernet protocols used in the 
lower layers as shown in Fig. 6. 
 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
 
The analysis and proposal for the new lift control are 
mandatory by new security level requirements.  The 
innovative aspect of this collaborative project was the 
capacity to replace the safety chain electromechanical 
components (serial electric contacts) by dedicated ﬁeldbus 
network.  In this research project, we identiﬁed an adapted IP 
protocols to support dependability constraints for lift 
applications control. The IEC 61508 requirements for the 
performance machines applied to lift application have been 
regrouped into PESSRAL speciﬁcations. The paper 
summarizes the necessary criteria to achieve in the protocols 
selection to ensure the integrity of the PESSRAL standard. 
The mixed methodology allows integrating the 
communication architecture in the development in order to 
ensure the time performances based on deterministic operating 
system and safety by construction. Our contribution will allow 
to perform a safety chain analysis which is impossible to 
diagnose at this time. After specifying safety constraints 
required in the lift application, the next task will be devoted 
to the modeling of a safe communication. This modeling will 
be included in the modeling of a deterministic core used 
in the ADN4SE project. At least, this strategy will allow 
displacements command of the lift cabin in safe conditions 
clearly identiﬁed, which greatly simpliﬁes the maneuver that 
today requires human intervention locally. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.  OpenSAFETY over real-time Ethernet. 
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